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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to uncover a new level of thinking regarding the 
discourse and debate around the standard of reasonable doubt and how it is used in our 
court rooms. The current argument surrounding the reasonable doubt standard has 
become circular and reached an impasse. By introducing the lens of social control and 
using the writings of notable French philosopher Michel Foucault, this paper looks at the 
origins and development of the reasonable doubt standard and links it with the increasing 
methods of social control present in punishment as well as evaluating the cultural 
narrative around its origin and assessing why this standard was permitted to continue to 
be a cornerstone of the Anglo-American judicial system.  
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Comparisons of the Soul 
 Imagine you’re on trial for murder. Cases have been made, closing arguments 
have ceased, and the only thing standing between you and life in prison is the jury and the 
words ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. In the Anglo-American judicial system, there are 
several standards of proof that help judges and juries to decide on the guilt of the 
accused. The most stringent, the one used in criminal cases, is the standard of reasonable 
doubt. The thought is that unless the jury is convinced the accused committed the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then they must find him not guilty. Though never officially 
attached to any percentage, this standard translates to about 92% certain.1 This means that 
the jury must be at least 92% certain that the defendant committed the crime in order to 
convict. This standard is stricter than preponderance of the evidence, a standard 
traditionally used to determine liability in civil cases, that is translated to more than fifty 
percent certain, or as traditionally stated, more likely than not.2 Beyond a reasonable 
doubt means if any doubts remain that a reasonable man would find compelling, then the 
jury cannot, under law, find the defendant guilty. At first glance, this standard sounds 
ideal. Only those who are truly guilty will get sent to prison. However, there has been 
much debate in recent years as to whether the reasonable doubt standard is serving its 
purpose and whether the current standard should undergo revision. Current arguments 
regarding the validity of the reasonable doubt standard and its use in Anglo-American 
court rooms have reached an impasse due to conflicting normative frameworks and an 
                                                 
 
1 Woody, William Douglas, and Edie Greene. 2012. “Jurors’ Use of Standards of Proof in 
Decisions about Punitive Damages.” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 30 (6): 856–72. 
doi:10.1002/bsl.2027. 
2 Woody. “Jurors’ Use of Standards of Proof in Decisions about Punitive Damages,” 858  
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unwillingness to acknowledge reasons beyond the scope of the justice system. In this 
paper I will argue that by looking at the reasonable doubt standard through a Foucauldian 
lens and showing that the standard originated and developed in conjuncture with other 
methods of social control, we can see that the reasonable doubt standard is operating as a 
means to serve state interest, thereby rendering current arguments about the standard 
moot by showing that the purpose of reasonable doubt is not to ensure justice but rather 
to ensure the narrative of the state.  
In this paper I will first recount the most popular reasoning and arguments that 
make up the current debate of the reasonable doubt standard. Then I will analyze these 
arguments and show how they have stagnated as well as failed to consider different 
solutions to their problems. Next, I will examine how systems of trial, mirroring systems 
of punishment, shift their focus from body to soul. I will do this by examining how the 
shift from trail by ordeal to trial by jury and the exclusion of torture as a judicial practice 
led to the implementation of the reasonable doubt standard. I will then discuss the reasons 
for this change as well as its continued usage while outlining the benefits this standard 
gives to the state.   -- 
CURRENT ARGUMENT 
To understand the workings of the reasonable doubt standard, one must first 
understand the current debate and where it falls. Those familiar with the standard of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may find it hard to imagine that there are agents 
who would rather see the standard changed, despite how fully entrenched the standard 
has become in the Anglo-American court room. Many who argue against the continued 
use of the reasonable doubt standard do so from a consequentialist standpoint. 
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Consequentialism, as the name suggests, is more concerned with the consequences of any 
given action rather than the action themselves. Actions must be judged based on their 
consequences. Therefore, they judge the reasonable doubt standard based on the 
consequences of using that standard. The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is 
considered to be the highest level of proof under certainty, and as we can never be certain 
about many of the cases that come through the courts, we must settle for proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.3 Opponents of the reasonable doubt standard object to it partially due 
to this. They assert that because the standard of proof is so high, that many people who 
are actually guilty are being falsely acquitted. As the high rates of recidivism have 
shown, those who have committed crimes are most likely to commit crimes again. Some 
research even indicates that for every false acquittal, thirty-six new crimes are committed, 
seven of which are violent.4 From those arguing from a consequentialist standpoint, those 
consequences are not worth the cost. The trade-off being that if the standard of proof is 
lowered, while the rate of false acquittals might go down, it is likely that the rate of false 
convictions would rise. Opponents face this trade off and state that it is better one person 
suffer though a false conviction than multiple people suffer at the hands of criminals who 
have gone free.5 
There are still those who firmly believe that the reasonable doubt standard should 
remain the standard of proof used when deciding the outcome of criminal trials. Unlike 
                                                 
 
3 Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1991). 35-36 
4 Federico Picinali, "Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard Be Justified? A Reconstructed 
Dialogue," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 31, no. 02 (August 3, 2018), 369 
5 Picinali, "Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard Be Justified? A Reconstructed Dialogue," 
368-370 
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opponents of the reasonable doubt standard who speak from a consequentialist viewpoint, 
proponents argue instead from a deontological one. This is not to say that one’s 
philosophical views automatically determine their stance on reasonable doubt, but rather 
to show the origins and reasoning that fuel the current debate surrounding the issue.  
Those who agree with deontological theory believe that rather than judge actions by the 
good or bad consequences associated with them, actions are deemed good or bad due to a 
strict series of rules. They disagree with the arguments brought up by their opponents in 
several ways. First, those who support the continuance of the reasonable doubt standard 
stand firmly with Blackstone’s maxim, that it better for ten guilty men to go free than one 
innocent man to suffer.6 They stand by this maxim and believe that the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is the ideal way to meet it. They disagree with the research 
presented by their opponents and believe that the amount of harm caused by false 
acquittals is not that great and is less relevant than the harm caused by false convictions. 
They argue that lowering the standard of proof would most likely cause more false 
convictions to occur. False convictions, unlike false acquittals cause direct harm to an 
individual. Those arguing from a deontological perspective believe there is a difference 
between statistical lives, i.e. the lives that would be harmed by those released by false 
acquittals, and identified lives, the life of the person being falsely convicted. 
Furthermore, they believe there is a difference between our actions, or rather the actions 
we can control, and the actions of others. This being said, those who believe the standards 
                                                 
 
6 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4 (University of 
Chicago 
Press, 1979), 352. 
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should remain how it stands do so due to a mixture of beliefs revolving around not 
causing direct harm rather than evaluating consequences.7  
While both sides of the current debate make decent points, each side fails to 
realize some very important notions. First, each side is incapable of looking past their 
own normative framework. This essentially creates a conversation where the parties are 
talking past each other. This weakens their arguments partially because they cannot lend 
credence to other views and partially because this is preventing their arguments from 
going any further. Second, even with the high risk of victimization, wouldn’t a false 
conviction result in the same number of crimes as a false acquittal? Someone guilty is 
still roaming free and is likely to commit crime again. If we fail to catch the criminals 
that have caused harm to society, we are still failing in our duty to society, whether or not 
we are preventing false convictions. Third, the notion that the harm caused by crime is 
greater than that of the harm cause by false conviction is absurd. While this is perhaps 
true for violent crimes, such as serial rape or murder, is destroying someone's life, and 
most likely their family's life, through incarceration really equivalent to theft or drug 
crimes? Is it better than having a car stolen or having an adult getting high of their own 
volition? The stigma attached to those who have been in prison makes any sentence a life 
sentence, regardless of the time spent in custody. Neither side has a full grasp of the 
implications of their arguments and fails to think of the ramifications of the standard 
outside of the courtroom. 
                                                 
 
7Picinali, "Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard Be Justified? A Reconstructed Dialogue," 
371, 373,  
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Currently, both sides of the debate have a goal that they believe can be helped by 
either lowering or maintaining the reasonable doubt standard. These goals are in the form 
of decreasing either false convictions, or false acquittals. Each of these goals can be 
worked towards by alternate means. For false convictions increasing juror numbers, 
imposing unanimity in jury deliberations, instating judicial review of every guilty verdict, 
and excluding confessions and eyewitness testimony due to unreliability, would all 
increase the likelihood of accurate convictions. Regarding false acquittals, increasing 
police resources, investing more in the development of forensic science, improving 
surveillance systems, and generally improving evidence would also make convictions 
more accurate. Ultimately, it seems like the goal for both sides is to increase accurate 
convictions and ultimately make our court system more efficient in pursuing justice. 
Furthermore, studies have shown that “adults had significant difficulty understanding 
what the standard of proof meant” and when researchers “asked mock jurors in a 
negligence case about the standard of proof, only approximately half the jurors knew 
what percentage of evidence equals a preponderance”.8 This suggests that changing the 
standard would not lead to more accurate convictions as it is clear that jurors fail to apply 
these standards correctly when making a decision. Ultimately, both sides have a similar 
goal, but utterly fail to see the Anglo-American legal system as anything other than what 
it is on the surface. They see the court system as a way of punishing those who commit 
crimes and reasonable doubt as the standard we use to judge them. However, the biggest 
                                                 
 
8Woody. “Jurors’ Use of Standards of Proof in Decisions about Punitive Damages,” 859 
      9
 
impact made by the system, supported by the reasonable doubt standard, is not in the area 
of justice, but rather in the area of social control.  
SOCIAL CONTROL 
Social control is the way that society uses things like law, normality, and the 
structures built into our society to regulate the behavior of people. There are many forms 
and methods of social control, such as media, educational systems, and the penal system. 
Michel Foucault, a French philosopher who dealt heavily with the concept of social 
control stated 
“We must first rid ourselves of the illusion that penalty is above all (if not 
exclusively) a means of reducing crime and … we must analyze rather the 
concrete systems of punishment, study them as social phenomena that cannot be 
accounted for the juridical structure of society alone, nor by its fundamental 
ethical choices; we must situate them in their field of operation, in which the 
punishment of crime is not the sole element” 9 
As he suggests, it is only by ceasing to think of the criminal justice system as one that is 
only made for crime and punishment that we can leave the circular debate of reasonable 
doubt. The criminal justice system is a means of social control. By looking at the 
reasonable doubt standard as a means of control rather than justice, we can gain a new 
perspective on its origins and continued presence in our court rooms.  
 A key element of social control is the use of narrative. Therefore, if we wish to 
analyze the use of reasonable doubt, we must look at how narrative impacts the legal 
                                                 
 
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1977), 24. 
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system. In a criminal trial, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, however, both 
sides have the opportunity to share their version of events with the jury. What a criminal 
trial comes down to is who can tell the better story. Which side can spin the most 
compelling tale. Of course, evidentiary support and the testimony of expert witnesses can 
tilt the scale of justice in one side’s favor, but that will only lend so much support when 
the delivery of the facts is lacking. When the jury members cast their ballots, they are 
voting for the side that has convinced them, and so often, being convinced of something 
has less to do with the facts, and more to do with the confidence of the informant. Due to 
the very structure of the trial, narrative is an integral part of the Anglo-American legal 
system. Furthermore, the narrative surrounding the legal system as a whole is just as 
important as the individual narratives within the criminal trial. This overarching narrative 
often paints the system as one of justice. Those who have committed crimes will face the 
courts and eventually be sent to prison for their crimes. However, when looking at the 
legal system with social control in mind, it is easy to see that justice is not the focus of 
the system, rather the focus is punishing deviance and difference. The system doesn’t 
care who is innocent or guilty or who has been wronged or who truly deserves justice. 
The system is concerned with eliminating deviance from society. However, a narrative 
concerning itself with truth and justice is necessary for the system to function. Society 
needs some form of punishment or correction in order to uphold the social contract its 
citizens have engaged in.10 In order for this system to work, it must be seen as fair and 
valid. Criminal justice systems that do neither of those things often result in having a lack 
                                                 
 
10 John Locke and Peter Laslett, Two Treatise of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1993). 
      11
 
of authority and ability to punish or are torn down as a result of some greater revolution. 
Citizens will only submit willingly to the system of punishment if they believe it to be a 
fair and impartial judge. The reasonable doubt standard is an essential part of maintaining 
the validity of that narrative. Though we know that juries often base their verdicts on 
other factors, legally speaking, they are only permitted to find the defendant guilty if that 
guilt has been proven ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. The reasonable doubt standard is 
necessary to ensure that criminal trials are seen as fair and valid, whether or not they 
actually are. The reasonable doubt standard is doing exactly what is what meant to do as 
an element of social control. To prove this, we must look at the development of both 
social control and the reasonable doubt standard.  
  First, we can look at the similarities between the development of standards of 
proof in criminal trials and its similarities with emerging forms of social control. It would 
be nearly impossible to mark the true beginning of social control. Methods of social 
control have been present as long as society has. However, with the rise of personal 
freedoms it became increasingly necessary for new methods of social control to develop. 
In his book, Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault details a shift in systems of 
punishment, body to soul. His book opens with a vivid description of what can only be 
described as torture. A man condemned for the killing of his parents in 1757 was made to 
face justice, 
“where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, 
wax and sulpher melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four 
      12
 
horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes 
thrown to the winds.” 11 
In the same opening, Foucault goes on to repeat a schedule of 1837 “rules for the House 
of Young Prisoners in Paris” which detailed the strict structure those imprisoned must 
abide by, including various working hours, schooling, and a strict regimen sleep and 
meals12. These two different descriptions were separated by a difference of eighty years. 
This drastic change in punishment reflects the shift in focus from the body to the soul.  
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
This shift from punishing the body to punishing the soul is mirrored in the 
criminal trial. Long before our punishments shifted, our court proceedings began to 
undergo a pattern of change that would last hundreds of years. The notion that there must 
be a certain level of proof or evidence to convict and punish individuals has been around 
for centuries, even before the reasonable doubt standard. Before the development of the 
jury trail, there was trail by ordeal13. This process was both evaluative and punitive. The 
accused would be forced to undergo a painful, and often dangerous experience designed 
to test them, overseen by priests and other religious leaders of the time. The test was one 
of guilt, and it was thought that those who were guilty would perish during the ordeal and 
those who were innocent would live. There were variations of this formula across various 
communities, but the semantics were roughly the same – only pain and torture can reveal 
truth. Trial by ordeal was officially prohibited in 1215 by Pope Innocent III, however, 
                                                 
 
11 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 3 
12 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 6-7 
13 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 3 
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similar practices continued to occur, albeit rarely, into the 17th century, most notably 
regarding the witch hunts that were prevalent during that period.14 Trial by ordeal 
automatically linked the body and the soul. It was a way of judging the soul by torturing 
the body. If the body failed, giving out under the extreme pain and stress of the ordeal, 
then it was clear that the soul was guilty. There was no distinction made between the 
virtue of the body and that of the soul.  
After trial by ordeal was dismissed as an inappropriate way of determining guilt, 
England began the development of the jury trial. These early trials only bare a slight 
resemblance to the trials of today. In the 13th and 14th centuries, juries were made up of 
“men of the neighborhood” and “were assumed to know the fact and to incorporate their 
own knowledge in their verdict… guided by common sense and common knowledge”.15 
Witnesses were uncommon occurrences during the early centuries of trial and it was the 
men of the jury who were expected to investigate for themselves the events leading up to 
whatever illegal activity they’ve been called to evaluate. It wasn’t until the 16th century 
that trials became something easily likened to the courts of today. In 1523 Sir Thomas 
More argued that no evidence should be given to jurors outside of a court room. In 1563 
legislation was passed that required witnesses to appear in court when summoned and 
also made perjury illegal.16 The identity of the jury also began to change. Jurors were no 
longer pulled directly from the area where the crime was committed, but rather from 
                                                 
 
14 Halsall, Paul. "Midieval Sourcebook: Twelfth Ecumenical Council: Lateran IV 1215." 
Internet History Sourcebooks. March 1996. Accessed February 26, 2019. 
https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/lateran4.asp. 
15 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 3-4  
16 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 5-6 
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surrounding residential areas. Furthermore, jurors were no longer tasked with 
investigating the crime themselves, but were reassigned to be the impartial party we 
recognize them as today. Jury members were asked to listen and evaluate based on the 
evidence presented in court, not based on their own experiences or common knowledge. 
With these changes, witnesses became a more necessary part of trial as jurors could no 
longer interview witnesses outside of court. However, with the rise of witnesses came the 
question of credibility. How to know who is telling the truth? Who is being honest?  
The question of credibility was not one that was easily solved by the jury trial. 
After trial by ordeal ended, while England turned towards trial by jury, the rest of Europe 
used the Inquisition process to uncover illegal activity. It was a system designed to obtain 
‘full-proof’ in which proof was calculated based on the number of witnesses plus 
confession. The question of credibility was more easily solved by this process through the 
use of torture. The inquisition process partially revolved around torture and the use of 
torture to gain partial proof. The accused was often tortured repeatedly in order to get a 
confession, thereby rendering the credibility of any witness moot.17 In England, torture 
was illegal and technically never had a part in the official due process of the courts. 
However, torture was still commonly used in England to solicit guilty pleas from those 
accused. The difference between the two systems of torture, is that “Torture was in 
England an instrument of state and not of law. It was performed only under a warrant of 
                                                 
 
17 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 3 
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the King, with his sign manual.”18 This was not an act that was rarely performed, on the 
contrary,  
“Guy Fawkes, for instance, and other participants in the Gun Powder Conspiracy 
were tortured under a warrant signed by King James. The Tudor kings and queens 
had a fondness for it, and Hallam, the historian, says that "the rack seldom stood 
idle in the Tower, for all the latter part of Elizabeth's reign."19 
So, while not an official step in the judicial process, torture had its own place and purpose 
in England to help clear up the question of credibility. Trial by ordeal directly linked the 
body and the soul. While the jury trail formed in a way that could not directly act upon 
the body, the body, through the torture officiated by the state, was directly used to answer 
questions of guilt and credibility well into the 18th century, the last incident of traditional 
torture having been recorded in 1741, with less drastic methods having been used in the 
years following. It was not until 1828 that torture was finally removed from the judicial 
process all together.20 Over this ninety-year period, the state went from the frequent 
torture of those accused of crimes to the abolition of that means of control. This period of 
time strikingly overlaps the time period given between the two scenes of punishment in 
the opening of Discipline and Punish.21 This is not a coincidence, but rather an indication 
of shifting methods of social control. When the state was unable to retain the use of 
torture in order to exert its control on the legal system, another method of control had to 
                                                 
 
18 Ernest G. Black, "Torture under English Law," University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review and American Law Register 75, no. 4 (1927), 344 
19 Black, "Torture under English Law," 344 
20 Black, "Torture under English Law," 347 
21 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 6 
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be formed, in this case, the reasonable doubt standard fills the gap caused by the 
discontinuation of torture.  
 The question of witness credibility while partially answered by the state-
controlled torture, was also addressed by other means. Torture was still technically illegal 
within the courtroom, and not every criminal stood accused of crimes serious enough to 
be tortured by the crown. Therefore, it became necessary for other methods of credibility 
to be developed within the courtroom, where torture wasn’t an option. This led to the 
development of the satisfied conscience test. This test forms the basis for what would 
later become the reasonable doubt standard. In the early 17th century, Francis Bacon 
stated that “the supply of testimony and the discerning and credit of testimony” should be 
left entirely “to the jury’s consciences and understanding”22 This is to say, that it is the 
responsibility of the jury to determine whether or not a witness is credible based on their 
own conscience. Bacon’s words would later be used in a proclamation in 1607 regarding 
criminal trials. This is the foundation of the satisfied conscience test. The notion that a 
jury should judge each and every witness and only determine them to be credible if their 
own conscience is satisfied. Sir Matthew Hale expanded on this premise in the late 17th 
century, stating that if a jury has “just cause to disbelieve what a witness swears, they are 
not bound to give their verdict according to the evidence, or testimony of that witness.” 
He also firmly believed that “evidence might be of such high credibility that no 
reasonable man can without any just reason deny it.”23 Neither of these men used the 
                                                 
 
22 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 11 
23 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 12 
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term reasonable doubt, but there is no uncertainly that our current standard developed 
from these early concepts.  
 The satisfied conscience test arose as a means to determine witness credibility 
without the use of torture and also to placate jurors who were otherwise reluctant to 
convict. England was, after all, a Christian nation. Here once again we see the divergence 
from the body towards the soul. The satisfied conscience test was partially created to 
reassure jurors that they would not be sent to hell by the lord should they offer an 
incorrect verdict. Many jurors were frightened that they would be doomed to an eternity 
of damnation if they were to return an incorrect verdict, for the lord said, ‘judge not lest 
ye be judged.’ These fears were taken quite seriously in the 17th and 18th criminal trials. 
This test arose partially to convince jurors to convict with more frequency.24 This way, 
when the jurors were judged by God, they could honestly say they judged only what they 
believed to be truth, they only passed down convictions when their conscience was fully 
satisfied. This test was as entwined with the soul as torture is the body. The satisfied 
conscience test was firmly in place in the late 17th century, and in the 18th century when 
torture fell out of practice, it was the satisfied conscience test that the state fell back on. 
By the late 18th century, the body had no place in the criminal trial. Only the soul 
continued to make itself relevant to the judicial process. 
 The satisfied conscience test was only around a few centuries before reasonable 
doubt began to take the place of satisfied conscience. The first recorded use of the phrase 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ was during the Boston Massacre trials of 1770. These words 
                                                 
 
24 James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the 
Criminal Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 3. 
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were spoken by the prosecuting attorney who asserted that they had proved their case 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury must therefore convict. While the judge in 
that case instructed the jury according to the satisfied conscience test, there was no 
suggestion in the records that the standard stated by the prosecution was out of line or 
even uncommon25. The terms reasonable doubt and satisfied conscience were used 
sometimes interchangeably during the Irish Treason trials that took place towards the end 
of the century. The records of these trials between 1795-1796 indicate that it was not a 
new emerging standard, but rather a rebranding of the one that already existed.26 The 
phrase reasonable doubt was also found in some of the U.S. trials at the turn of the 
century. In 1798 when Matthew Lyon was on trail or seditious libel, the judge instructed 
the jury “you must be satisfied beyond all reasonable substantial doubt” and in 1800 for a 
trial of insurgents, the jury was advised “if you doubt it… you must acquit.”27 The 
question becomes why was this shift being made? Certainly, the notion of satisfied 
conscience achieved the same goals as the new phrasing of reasonable doubt, and it can 
be argued that if explained to a jury member, satisfied conscience is easier to understand 
than reasonable doubt. So why did the standard change? Some scholars believe that the 
shift was introduced by prosecuting attorneys to increase their chances for a conviction.28 
There are those who believed that satisfied conscience was too broad of a standard. They 
believed that the satisfied conscience test made it seem like any doubt could halt a 
rightful conviction, even doubts that have no rational basis in fact. The argument then 
                                                 
 
25 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 22 
26 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 23 
27 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 24 
28 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 21 
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follows that it is impossible to absolutely certain how a series of events occurred without 
being present for their occurrence. If being certain is an impossibility, then there must be 
some room left for doubt, which the satisfied conscience test does not allow. Therefore, 
the reasonable doubt standard is a better test for conviction because it prevents foolish 
doubts from interfering with justice. Regardless of the reason for the shift, satisfied 
conscience and reasonable doubt were firmly linked by the early 19th century. The 
language used in describing the standard was common among the educated classes of 
England and America at the time and these terms were used in several other disciplines 
such as philosophy, history, and theology.29 The shift from satisfied conscience to 
reasonable doubt took place and was mostly complete during the eighty-year period 
pointed out by Foucault as a time of tremendous change.   
REASONABLE DOUBT 
 Other than some minor theories of emergence, such as the one discussed above, 
there are no clear-cut historical answers for why reasonable doubt eclipsed the satisfied 
conscience test nor are there any for why the standard continues to exist today. The 
reason for this is the same reason the current debate regarding reasonable doubt has 
become circular – failure to look at the development of the standard as a form of social 
control. The reason the standards shifted from satisfied conscience to reasonable doubt is 
because reasonable doubt further the interest of the state. The use of the term ‘reasonable’ 
is very telling. Unlike the phrase ‘satisfied conscience’ which holds basically the same 
meaning today as it did in the 17th century, the term ‘reasonable’ changes widely over 
                                                 
 
29 Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause, 25 
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time and place. What can be considered reasonable today, according to modern standards, 
probably was considered irrational or perverse according to the standards held by those 
who lived centuries ago. So why continue to use the term reasonable? Its because it 
furthers the interest of the state. The state can control the definition of the term 
‘reasonable’ much more than it can control the phrase ‘satisfied conscience’. The legal 
system loves the term reasonable. Terms like ‘reasonable man’ or ‘reasonable steps’ are 
present in the wording of many laws that are currently on the books. For example, 
professional negligence is defined under a particular U.S. State as “the failure of a 
provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or 
knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and 
experienced providers of health care,” the important phrase there being “reasonable 
care.”30 This ties back in with the importance of narrative within the legal system. The 
state, by using and controlling the term ‘reasonable,’ and make those who disagree with 
their interests unreasonable, allowing the state to further tighten their control over 
society.  
Who is the state controlling by the continued endorsement of this standard? 
Juries, who would have otherwise failed to convict are now reassured by oaths and the 
reasonable doubt standard. They are given leave to convict with the understanding that 
their souls are safe. Those who stand accused are being controlled. Convicted persons are 
much more likely to come to peace with their sentence if the trail process is seen as fair.31 
                                                 
 
30 NRS 41A.015, Nevada Revised Statutes (2019) 
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31 Wrightsman, Lawrence S., Edie Greene, and Kirk Heilbrun. Psychology and the Legal 
System. 8th ed. Sydney: Thompson Wadsworth, 2014. 
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The general populace is being controlled. They are made to believe that the judicial 
system is truly one of justice rather than simply punishment, or process rather than 
torture. When looking at the narrative, it is easy to believe that reasonable doubt arose as 
an advancement of the people’s power, but this is not the true purpose of the standard. 
This would only be the case if the standard did what it claims to do, ensure justice and 
accurate convictions. However, we know that juries don’t understand standards of proof 
or how to correctly apply them.32 Yet we are still made to embrace this standard as a 
pillar of equality under the law. This is not the purpose of this standard.  
CONCLUSION 
In the Anglo-American legal system, the state once held an enormous amount of 
power, first though trial by ordeal and then later by the use of torture. When it became 
clear that torture, both as a punishment and as a means to gain confessions, was no longer 
going to be an option the reasonable doubt standard began to rise. The state chose 
reasonable doubt as its replacement. It not only ensures a narrative of truth and justice, 
but it acts as a standard so vague, the state can easily bend the definition to suit its needs, 
hence the shift from ‘satisfied conscience’ to ‘reasonable doubt’. Foucault, in his book 
Discipline and Punish, describes the shift from punishment of the body to punishment of 
the soul, that takes place roughly over a span of eighty-years. During this brief period, 
many instruments of social control were being developed and implemented, such as the 
penal institution. During the same span of eighty-years, the focus of the criminal trial 
shifted, much like punishment, from the body to the soul, exchanging torture and 
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uncertainty for what appear to be clear tests of credibility and evidentiary support, when 
in reality it is a phantom standard, only serving to validate state narrative. The prison is a 
clear method of social control, one that the state has a vested interest in. It logically 
follows that the state also has an interest in controlling the barrier between freedom and 
incarceration, the criminal trial. The state cannot allow the criminal trial to operate in 
such a way that is contrary to the desires of the state. The answer lies in the standard of 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is not only easily controlled by the state but is 
also one that most jurors fail to grasp. They make their decision based on how the 
defendant looks, or how well the prosecuting attorney speaks, or maybe the just flip a 
coin and hope to be done before lunch. Anyone would say that this standard is clearly 
ineffective, but that is incorrect. The standard is not ineffective, because justice was never 
its purpose. The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt was designed, kept purposely 
vague, and has been a staple of the Anglo-American legal system for the past three 
hundred years because reasonable doubt serves state interest. So, let’s go back to the 
beginning. You’re on trial for murder. Cases have been made, closing arguments have 
ceased, and the only thing standing between you and life in prison is the jury and the 
words ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. 
